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debtors.  Thus, a party seeking substantive consolidation of a debtor with a non-debtor must meet 
a heavier burden to show that the benefits outweigh the potential harms.   
Discussion  
I. The Bankruptcy Court’s Equitable Powers Likely Extend to the Ability to 
Substantively Consolidate Debtors and Non-Debtor Entities  
 
Bankruptcy courts have been granted broad equitable powers.6  Courts have recognized 
that these powers extend to the power to substantively consolidate a debtor with other debtor 
entities.7  The courts may not, however, exercise their equitable powers in a manner that 
contravenes other provisions of the Code.8  Courts have disagreed whether the substantive 
consolidation of a debtor with a non-debtor would contravene the specifically laid out process for 
involuntary bankruptcy.  While it has been established that courts can substantively consolidate 
multiple debtor entities, some courts have been reluctant to consolidate debtors with non-debtor 
entities.9  However, it is likely that under at least some circumstances courts can and will 
substantively consolidate a debtor with a non-debtor entity.  
A. Substantive Consolidation in Relation to Involuntary Bankruptcy Provisions  
Courts have disagreed whether substantive consolidation is a separate remedy from 
involuntary bankruptcy or a tool that improperly bypasses involuntary bankruptcy procedure.  
The issue with substantively consolidating a debtor with a non-debtor is that it can be viewed as 
circumventing the requirements of involuntary bankruptcy.  Courts have held that because there 
are specific provisions laying out the process for involuntary bankruptcy, anything that cuts out 
                                                
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
7 See In re Giller, 962 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Owens Corning 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); In re 
Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
8 See Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014). 
9 See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. The Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, 562 B.R. at 
762–63 (holding that not only did the court lack the authority to substantively consolidate debtor with non-debtor 
nonprofit, but also that even it did have the authority, it would decline to do so under the circumstances there). 
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that process is circumventing the Code.10  Substantive consolidation of a debtor with a non-
debtor is effectively forcing a non-debtor into bankruptcy without following the procedure laid 
out in the Code.11   
Further, courts have questioned whether they have jurisdiction over non-debtors and their 
assets.  For example in In re Circle Land & Cattle Corp., the court reasoned that to substantively 
consolidate a non-debtor farmer with a debtor would improperly extend subject matter 
jurisdiction over a non-debtor.12  Additionally, the court in In re Pearlman asserted that 
“substantive consolidation is purely a bankruptcy remedy and does not extend to the assets and 
affairs of a non-debtor.”13   
According to In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, to substantively 
consolidate a debtor with a nonprofit non-debtor entity would contravene section 303(a) because 
the entities targeted for consolidation are usually exempt from involuntary bankruptcy.14  Section 
303(a) prohibits forcing “a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial 
corporation,” including eleemosynary15 institutions, into bankruptcy.16  Although involuntary 
bankruptcy and substantive consolidation are considered distinct remedies, substantive 
consolidation would effectively force a non-debtor nonprofit entity into bankruptcy against its 
will.17  Under analogous circumstances, the court in In re Circle Land & Cattle Corp. held that it 
could not substantively consolidate a debtor with a non-debtor farmer because farmers are 
                                                
10 In re Pearlman, 462 B.R. 849, 851 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012). 
11 See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. The Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, 562 B.R at 
762–63. 
12 213 B.R. at 876–77 (“Using § 105 to support an equitable order of substantive consolidation of a non-debtor with 
a debtor is, in effect, taking jurisdiction over the non-debtor corporation without express statutory authority.”). 
13 462 B.R. at 851. 
14 553 B.R. 693, 703–04 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016), aff’d Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. The 
Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, 562 B.R. 755 (D. Minn. 2016). 
15 Eleemosynary institutions include churches, schools, and charitable organizations and foundations.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines eleemosynary as “[o]f, relating to, or assisted by charity; not-for-profit.” bars the involuntary 
bankruptcy of “a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation.” (10th ed. 2014).  
16 11 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
17 See In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, 553 B.R. at 703–04. 
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excepted from involuntary bankruptcy.18  Thus, it seems that courts are very reluctant to 
substantively consolidate a debtor with a non-debtor, especially when the non-debtor falls into 
the category of entities usually excepted from involuntary bankruptcy.  
B. Substantive Consolidation as a Tool for Realizing a Debtor’s Total Assets  
Despite some courts’ reluctance to consolidate debtors with non-debtors, many courts 
have allowed the consolidation of a debtor with a non-debtor under certain circumstances.19  For 
example, some courts have allowed substantive consolidation when non-debtors have been 
determined to be alter egos of the debtor.20  In cases like these, substantive consolidation is 
justified because the consolidation is not involuntarily dragging non-debtors into bankruptcy.  
Rather, consolidation is recognizing that the debtor and non-debtor entities are not truly separate 
and that the consolidation is necessary to reach the debtor’s true assets. 
Courts that have allowed the consolidation of a debtor with non-debtors have reasoned 
that because substantive consolidation and involuntary bankruptcy are distinct remedies, 
substantive consolidation does not circumvent the involuntary bankruptcy process.21  Also, if a 
party seeking substantive consolidation was required to meet all the provisions necessary for 
involuntary bankruptcy, it would defeat the purpose of substantive consolidation.22  The 
argument is that substantive consolidation is completely independent of involuntary bankruptcy 
and is meant to be an alternate means to bring a non-debtor’s assets into a debtor’s estate.23 
                                                
18 213 B.R. at 876. 
19 See In re Logistics Info. Sys., Inc., 432 B.R. at 11 (“The majority of bankruptcy courts have found non-debtor 
consolidation to be appropriate in some circumstances.”); In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 765. 
20 In re United Stairs Corp., 176 B.R. 359, 371 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995) (holding that alter egos are not entitled to the 
procedural safeguards of section 303). 
21 See Matter of Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. 390, 397–98 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990). 
22 See id. (“[T]he insolvency requirement of § 303 would subvert the entire purpose of substantive consolidation in 
this case, which is to recover assets from a financially sound affiliated entity.”); see also In re S & G Fin. Servs. of 
S. Florida, Inc., 451 B.R. 573, 582 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (“Compelling the Trustee to file an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C. § 303 would defeat the very purpose of substantive consolidation.”). 
23 See Matter of Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. at 397–98. 
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II. The Standard for Substantively Consolidating a Debtor with a Non-Debtor is 
Higher than for the Consolidation of Multiple Debtor Entities  
Circuit courts have established different standards for deciding when substantive 
consolidation is warranted.  The D.C. Circuit has held that substantive consolidation of a debtor 
is warranted when there is a “substantial identity” between the entities to be consolidated and 
consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or to realize some benefit.24  The Eighth Circuit, 
drawing on Auto-Train, has held that when considering whether to substantively consolidate 
debtors, courts should look at (1) the necessity of consolidation due to the interrelationship 
among the debtors; (2) whether the benefits of consolidation outweigh the harm to creditors; and 
(3) the prejudice resulting from not consolidating debtors.25  Although the test is meant to be 
flexible and not mechanically applied, courts have often considered the difficulty of separating 
the entities, the extent to which finances have been comingled, whether there are consolidated 
financial statements, unity of interest and ownership, disregard for corporate formalities, and the 
existence of parent and inter-corporate guarantees on loans.26   
The Second Circuit and Third Circuit have both applied a similar test where a party seeking 
to substantively consolidate debtors must show that the entities targeted to be consolidated 
disregarded separateness so significantly that their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity 
borders and treated them as one legal entity, or that the entities’ assets and liabilities are so 
scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and hurts all creditors.27  
                                                
24  See In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d at 276. 
25  In re Giller, 962 F.2d at 799 (allowing for substantive consolidation when abuses of corporate form and 
fraudulent conveyances made consolidation necessary). 
26 In re Vecco Construction Industries, Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). 
27 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211; In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d at 515; see also In re 
Bonham, 229 F. 3d at 766 (adopting the Augie/Restivo test and applying it when consolidating a debtor and non-
debtor). 
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When deciding whether to consolidate a debtor with non-debtor entities, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted the Augie/Restivo test.28  As with the substantive consolidation of a debtor with other 
debtor entities, a party seeking to consolidate a debtor with non-debtor entities must show that 
the finances are inextricably intertwined.29  Only when the movant can meet the pleading 
requirement of showing that the debtor and non-debtor have an inseparable interest, substantive 
consolidation may be granted.30  
While substantive consolidation of a debtor and non-debtor is possible, the standard is more 
stringent than for consolidating debtors.31  Courts have been reluctant to consolidate a debtor 
with a non-debtor except under extraordinary circumstances.32  Additionally, courts that have 
recognized the power to substantively consolidate a debtor and non-debtor have exercised that 
power cautiously.33  
Common throughout the tests is that substantive consolidation must be necessary.  No single 
factor can automatically trigger substantive consolidation.  For example in Augie/Restivo, the 
court said “Commingling, therefore, can justify substantive consolidation only where ‘the time 
and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them [is] so substantial as to threaten the 
                                                
28 See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 766. 
29 See Matter of Munford, Inc., 115 B.R. at 397–99.   
30 See id. 
31 See In re Lease-a-Fleet, Inc., 141 B.R. 869, 872–73 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (“While consolidation of debtor and 
non-debtor entities is possible, it should be undertaken only in the most unusual circumstances”). 
32 See id. at 874 (“It is therefore not surprising to this court to find that placing an involuntary non-debtor 
consolidate in such an unusual circumstance, betwixt and between the Bankruptcy Code, should be reserved for 
unusual circumstances which might justify such a conceptually-strange measure.”). 
33 See In Re Logistics Info. Sys., Inc., 432 B.R. at 12 (“While such power should be used cautiously, the great 
weight of cases supports the authority of bankruptcy courts to order substantive consolidation of debtors and non-
debtors.”); see also In re Howland, No. 16-5499, 2017 WL 24750 at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Substantive 
consolidation is an ‘extreme’ measure, only to be used ‘sparingly,’ especially when consolidating a non-debtor 
entity.”).   
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realization of any net assets for all the creditors[.]’”34  Another important factor that every court 
considers is potential harm to creditors.  For example in Augie/Restivo, the Court held that 
“substantive consolidation should be used only after it has been determined that all creditors will 
benefit because untangling is either impossible or so costly as to consume the assets.”35  Further, 
one court said that the courts should “ask are any creditors going to be hurt by this consolidation 
and, if the answer to that is yes (or more properly, if the one seeking consolidation cannot prove 
the opposite), consolidation should be denied in almost every case.”36 
Conclusion 
 Meeting the standard to substantively consolidate a debtor and a non-debtor is difficult.  
While some courts have been reluctant to substantively consolidate a debtor and a non-debtor 
because it can be viewed as circumventing the involuntary bankruptcy process, the courts that 
have allowed substantive consolidation of a debtor and non-debtor have applied a stricter 
standard than when consolidating multiple debtors.  First, it is generally more difficult to show 
that a debtor and a non-debtor entity are so inextricably intertwined that consolidation is 
necessary than it is for related debtor entities.  Second, because all creditors must be equitably 
treated, it is much harder to show that the creditors of the non-debtor entities will not be harmed.  
Therefore, even when courts assert that they have the ability to substantively consolidate debtor 
and non-debtor entities, they often decline to do so because of the demanding burden moving 
parties face in showing that the entities are sufficiently intertwined and that no creditors will be 
harmed. 
 
                                                
34 In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d at 519 
35 Id.  
36 In re Circle Land & Cattle Corp., 213 B.R. at 875–76; see also In re Amco Ins., 444 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(“This Court has stated that substantive consolidation affects the substantive rights of the parties and therefore is 
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny”). 
